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JURISDICTION 
This case is before the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 
78-2-2(3)(j) and pursuant to the summary judgment entered as a final judgment by the 
trial court. The appeal was referred to the Utah Court of Appeals under Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2a-3(2)G). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL 
Pursuant to Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Appellee 
Fireman's Fund Insurance Company ("Fireman's Fund") is dissatisfied with Appellant 
Big Sky Finance Company's ("Big Sky") statement of issues on appeal. As such, 
Fireman's Fund submits the following as a correct statement of the issues on appeal: 
1. Did the district court err in granting Fireman's Fund's uncontested 
Motion for Summary Judgment and determining that the only claim Big Sky raised 
against Fireman's Fund was one for fraudulent nondisclosure - a claim the district court 
concluded was factually and legally without merit? 
2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying Big Sky's Motion 
for Leave to File a Second Amended Complaint? 
STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. An appellate court reviews the trial court's grant of summary 
judgment for correctness, affording no special deference to the trial court's legal 
conclusions. See Girbich v. Numed Inc.. 977 P.2d 1205 (Utah 1999). The reviewing 
court may affirm a grant of summary judgment on any ground available to the trial court, 
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even if it is not relied on below. See Higgins v. Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d 231 (Utah 
1993). 
2. The decision to grant a party leave to amend is left to the sound 
discretion of the district court. See e.g., Aurora Credit Servs., Inc. v. Liberty West Dev., 
Inc.. 970 P.2d 1273, 1281 (Utah 1998); Westlev v. Fanner's Ins. Exch.. 663 P.2d 93, 94 
(Utah 1983). A district court's decision regarding leave to amend will not be disturbed 
absent an abuse of discretion resulting in prejudice to the complaining party. See Norman 
v. Arnold, 2002 UT 81, P38. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE. 
In November 1997, Big Sky filed suit against Avis and Archibald Title 
Insurance ("Avis and Archibald") for violating escrow instructions relating to a real estate 
investment between Big Sky and an individual by the name of Wayne Ogden. 
In April 2002, Big Sky filed an Amended Complaint seeking to recover 
damages from Avis and Archibald's insurance companies, Lawyer's Title and Fireman's 
Fund. Big Sky's Amended Complaint alleged that Fireman's Fund fraudulently failed to 
disclose the existence of an insurance policy that it alleges would have provided liability 
coverage for the claims Big Sky had asserted against Avis and Archibald. In response to 
a motion for summary judgment filed by Lawyer's Title, Big Sky sought leave to file a 
Second Amended Complaint to add additional causes of action. The trial court denied 
Big Sky's Motion for Leave to Amend and granted Lawyer's Title's Motion for Summary 
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Judgment. 
Later, Fireman's Fund moved for summary judgment in its own right. Big Sky 
made no effort whatsoever in opposing Fireman's Fund's Motion for Summary Judgment, 
and on August 9, 2004, the trial court granted Fireman's Fund's Motion finding it to be 
meritorious. Despite having filed no opposition to Fireman's Fund's Motion, Big Sky 
now appeals the trial court's ruling. 
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS. 
Big Sky filed its original Complaint on November 17, 1997. (R. 001.) More 
than four years later, on April 2, 2002, Big Sky filed an Amended Complaint, naming 
Fireman's Fund as an additional defendant. (R. 174.) On June 11, 2004, Fireman's Fund 
filed its Motion for Summary Judgment. (R. 452.) After Big Sky made no effort to 
oppose Fireman's Fund's Motion, on August 9, 2004, the trial court granted the same. 
(R. 589.) On September 10, 2004, the trial court signed an order granting Fireman's 
Fund's Motion. (R. 592.) On March 22, 2005, the trial court entered an order making its 
September 10, 2004 Order on Fireman's Fund's Motion for Summary Judgment final and 
appealable under Rule 54(b). (R. 694.) On March 29, 2005, Big Sky filed a notice of 
appeal regarding the trial court's March 22, 2005 Order. (R. 674.) 
C. DISPOSITION OF THE COURT. 
The trial court granted Fireman's Fund's uncontested Motion for Summary 
Judgment on August 9, 2004, dismissing Big Sky's claim as a matter of law. (R. 589.) 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The following facts are taken in large part from Defendant Fireman's Fund's 
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment. Because Big Sky failed to 
oppose Fireman's Fund's Motion, these facts are deemed admitted pursuant to Rule 
7(c)(3)(A) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
I. The Big Sky Lawsuit 
1. On November 14, 1997, Big Sky filed suit against Avis and 
Archibald Title Insurance Company, and its escrow agent, Jayson Cherry, for violating 
escrow instructions concerning the disbursement of certain funds relating to a real estate 
investment between Big Sky and an individual by the name of Wayne Ogden. Avis and 
Archibald was represented by its private attorneys Nalder & Stratford during this time. 
(See generally. R. 456-58; R. 459, f 19.) 
2. On February 13, 1998, Big Sky served a set of discovery requests on 
Avis and Archibald seeking certain documents relevant to its claim. (R. 459, f 20.) 
3. On April 2, 1998, Avis and Archibald responded to Big Sky's 
discovery requests by producing a copy of the policy and Declarations Sheet from Avis 
and Archibald's Professional Liability Policy with Fireman's Fund as well as contact 
information for Fireman's Fund. (R. 459-60, ^ 21.) 
4. On April 8, 1999, apparently not recognizing the production of the 
same information a year beforehand, counsel for Big Sky again inquired as to the identity 
of Avis and Archibald's insurance company. (R. 460, |22.) 
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5. On April 12, 1999, counsel for Avis and Archibald again produced a 
copy of the Fireman's Fund policy, Declarations Sheet and contact information, and 
indicated that this information had been produced a year earlier. (R. 460, 123.) 
6. On April 26, 1999, Avis and Archibald informed Fireman's Fund for 
the first time of the lawsuit filed by Big Sky. This letter was copied to Big Sky, and again 
included the contact information and policy number for Avis and Archibald's policy with 
Fireman's Fund. (R. 460, 124.) 
7. On June 10, 1999, Fireman's Fund (a/k/a Interstate) acknowledged 
receipt of Avis and Archibald's April 26, 1999 notice of claim, indicating that it was the 
first notice it had received of the Big Sky lawsuit. Fireman's Fund also indicated that 
there were coverage issues that would have to be determined. (R. 460,125.) 
8. On January 16, 2002, the trial court granted a motion by Big Sky for 
leave to file an amended complaint. (R. 461,127.) Big Sky's Amended Complaint added 
Fireman's Fund as a defendant, claiming fraudulent non-disclosure of the existence of a 
policy of insurance. Big Sky claimed that Fireman's Fund had somehow attempted to 
conceal the fact that it had issued a professional liability policy to Avis and Archibald. 
(R. 461,128.) 
9. Big Sky's Amended Complaint also added Lawyer's Title Insurance 
Corporation ("Lawyer's Title") as a defendant, also claiming fraudulent non-disclosure of 
the existence of a policy of insurance. (R. 181.) 
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II. Lawyer's Title's Motion for Summary Judgment and Big 
Sky's Motion to File Second Amended Complaint 
10. On July 22, 2003, Lawyer's Title moved for summary judgment, 
arguing that Big Sky's claim for fraudulent nondisclosure failed as a matter of law. (R. 
204.) In substance, Lawyer's Title argued that, while it had no duty to do so, the 
undisputed evidence showed that Lawyer's Title had in fact disclosed all of the 
information Big Sky requested regarding the existence of an insurance policy that had 
been issued to Lawyer's Title. (R. 210-11.) Accordingly, Lawyer's Title argued there 
was no basis for Big Sky's claim. (R. 211.) 
11. On July 31, 2003, Big Sky responded to Lawyer's Title's Motion 
and made a cross motion for summary judgment. (R. 334.) In addition, on or about 
September 18, 2003, now several years after Big Sky filed its original Complaint, Big Sky 
moved for leave to file a Second Amended Complaint. (R. 313.) 
12. In its supporting memorandum, Big Sky argued that it needed to 
amend its complaint and add specific causes of action to allege that Lawyers Title "is 
liable for the acts of its agent [Avis and Archibald], as detailed in the Utah statutory law 
and the general common law of agent/principal or respondeat superior." (R. 314.) 
13. Accompanying Big Sky's Motion for Leave to Amend was a copy of 
Big Sky's (Proposed) Second Amended Complaint, which added an Eighth Cause of 
Action. (R. 317.) Big Sky's Eighth Cause of Action purports to allege claims against 
Lawyer's Title for statutory liability under Utah Code Ann. § 31A-23-308, vicarious 
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liability under respondeat superior, and against Fireman's Fund and Lawyer's Title for 
insurer liability for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. (R. 325-26.)l 
14. Lawyer's Title filed a memorandum opposing Big Sky's motion to 
amend, and Fireman's Fund formally joined in the same. (R. 384; R. 411, respectively.) 
15. After briefing was completed and oral argument heard, the trial court 
ruled on the various motions. Among other things, the trial court determined that Big 
Sky's Amended Complaint asserted a single cause of action for fraudulent nondisclosure. 
(R. 573.) The trial court found that based on the undisputed facts, Big Sky's 
nondisclosure claim against Lawyer's Title failed as a matter of law, and therefore, 
Lawyer's Title's Motion for Summary Judgment should be granted. (R. 573-74.) The 
trial court also determined that Big Sky's Motion to Amend should be denied based on 
considerations of untimeliness, no justification for delay, and prejudice. (R. 575.) 
III. Fireman's Fund's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
16. On June 11, 2004, Fireman's Fund filed its Motion for Summary 
Judgment. (R. 452.) Similar to Lawyer's Title, in its supporting memorandum, 
Fireman's Fund argued that Big Sky's claim for fraudulent nondisclosure failed as a 
matter of law. (R. 462.) 
1
 For reasons described later in this brief, it is important to note that the only claim 
set forth in the Eighth Cause of Action that is directed at Fireman's Fund is for breach of 
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 
7 
17. Fireman's Fund explained that, while it had no duty to do so, it too 
had previously provided Big Sky with a copy of the Fireman's Fund policy and, as such, 
Big Sky's claim for fraudulent nondisclosure of the insurance policy lacked merit. (R. 
465-66.) 
18. Fireman's Fund also argued that Big Sky's claim for fraudulent 
nondisclosure should be dismissed based on the expiration of the three-year statute of 
limitations Utah law imposes on any action for fraud. (R. 466-68.) 
19. Big Sky made absolutely no effort to oppose Fireman's Fund's 
Motion for Summary Judgment. (Brief of Appellant, Fact No. 47.) 
20. In a decision dated August 9, 2004, the trial court noted that 
Fireman's Fund's Motion was uncontested, but granted the same finding it to be 
meritorious. (R. 589.) 
21. On September 10, 2004, the trial court signed an order granting 
Fireman's Fund's Motion and making the following findings: 
The Court finds that plaintiff Big Sky is unable to show that 
Fireman's Fund owed it a duty to disclose under the undisputed 
facts of this case as Big Sky shared no contractual, fiduciary or 
confidential relationship with Fireman's Fund. In addition, the 
Court finds that Big Sky's claim for fraudulent non-disclosure lacks 
factual merit as a copy of Avis & Archibald's insurance policy with 
Fireman's Fund was in fact disclosed to Big Sky no later than April 
of 1998. Finally, the Court finds that Big Sky has failed to bring its 
fraudulent non-disclosure claim within the applicable statute of 
limitations. 
(R. 593.) 
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22. On March 22, 2005, the trial court entered an order making its 
September 10, 2004 Order on Fireman's Fund's Motion for Summary Judgment and its 
July 8, 2004 Order on Lawyer's Title's Motion for Summary Judgment final and 
appealable under Rule 54(b). (R. 694.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Big Sky has filed the instant appeal asking that this Court reverse the trial 
court's ruling on Fireman's Fund's Motion for Summary Judgment. Even though Big 
Sky made no effort to oppose Fireman's Fund's Motion at the trial court level, Big Sky 
argues that the trial court's ruling should be reversed. 
It has long been held in Utah that, as a general rule, appellate courts will not 
consider issues raised for the first time on appeal. By failing to oppose Fireman's Fund's 
Motion for Summary Judgment, each issue raised by Big Sky respecting the trial court's 
ruling on Fireman's Fund's Motion is an issue raised for the first time on appeal. 
Because Big Sky has presented no reasonable justification for its failure to preserve issues 
for appeal, Fireman's Fund should be dismissed from this appeal. 
In addition, the facts of this case demonstrate that, even if Big Sky had 
preserved issues for appeal, the trial court's decision granting Fireman's Fund's Motion 
for Summary Judgment was correct in all respects. As a result, Fireman's Fund requests 
that the decision of the trial court be affirmed. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. BIG SKY DID NOT OPPOSE FIREMAN'S FUND'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND THEREFORE 
FAILED TO PRESERVE ANY ISSUES FOR APPEAL. 
Big Sky's appeal from the trial court's decision on Defendant Fireman's 
Fund's Motion for Summary Judgment is fatally flawed and should be dismissed. 
On June 11, 2004, Fireman's Fund moved for summary judgment. (R. 452.) 
Big Sky's Amended Complaint alleged a single cause of action - fraudulent non-
disclosure. Fireman's Fund moved for summary judgment on the basis that it owed no 
duty to disclose to Big Sky, a third party claimant, the existence of the insurance policy. 
(R. 463.) Furthermore, Big Sky's claim completely lacked merit as the undisputed facts 
clearly showed that a copy of the insurance policy had been disclosed to Big Sky from the 
outset of its litigation with the insured, Avis and Archibald. (R. 465.) In addition, Big 
Sky's claim for fraudulent non-disclosure was barred by the applicable statute of 
limitations. (R. 466.) 
Under Utah law, when a motion for summary judgment is made and properly 
supported, the adverse party must respond in order to oppose the motion. See e.g.. Rule 
56, Utah R. Civ. P. ("an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials 
of the pleadings, but the response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must 
set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.") "Summary 
judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against a party failing to file such a response." 
See id. 
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In this case, Big Sky made absolutely no effort to oppose Fireman's Fund's 
Motion for Summary Judgment. Big Sky filed no opposition memorandum, no affidavit, 
no motion for a Rule 56(f) continuance, nothing. Fireman's Fund's Motion was 
completely uncontested. On August 9, 2004, the trial court granted Fireman's Fund's 
Motion, finding the uncontested motion to be meritorious. (R. 589.) On September 10, 
2004, the trial court entered an order regarding Fireman's Fund's Motion, which stated, in 
relevant part: 
The Court finds that plaintiff Big Sky is unable to show that 
Fireman's Fund owed it a duty to disclose under the undisputed 
facts of this case as Big Sky shared no contractual, fiduciary or 
confidential relationship with Fireman's Fund. In addition, the 
Court finds that Big Sky's claim for fraudulent non-disclosure lacks 
factual merit as a copy of Avis & Archibald's insurance policy with 
Fireman's Fund was in fact disclosed to Big Sky no later than April 
of 1998. Finally, the Court finds that Big Sky has failed to bring its 
fraudulent non-disclosure claim within the applicable statute of 
limitations. 
(R. 593.) On March 22, 2005, the trial court entered an order making its September 10, 
2004 Order on Fireman's Fund's Motion for Summary Judgment final and appealable 
under Rule 54(b). (R. 694.) 
Despite having made absolutely no effort to oppose Fireman's Fund's Motion 
at the trial court level, Big Sky has filed the instant appeal asking that this Court reverse 
the trial court's ruling. In so doing, Big Sky attempts to raise issues that have not been 
preserved and that have been raised for the first time on appeal. 
In Utah, it is well settled that appellate courts will not address issues raised for 
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the first time on appeal. See Smith v. Four Corners Mental Health Ctr.. 2003 UT 23, PI9 
(refusing to address any new arguments raised for the first time on appeal.); Healthcare 
Services Group v. Utah Department of Health, 2002 UT 5 (declining to reach the merits 
of new arguments raised for the first time on appeal); Carrier v. Salt Lake County, 2004 
UT 98, P43. The only recognized exceptions to this rule arise when "exceptional 
circumstances" or plain error are demonstrated. See e.g., Pugh v. Draper City, 2005 UT 
12, PI8; Walter v. Stewart. 2003 UT App 86, P33, cert, denied, 73 P.3d 946 (Utah 2003); 
State v. Mabe, 864 P.2d 890, 893 n.6 (Utah 1993) ("Absent exceptional circumstances, 
this court will not consider issues raised for the first time on appeal.") "This rule is 
based, in part, on the principle that it is unfair to fault the trial court for failing to rule 
correctly on an issue it was never given the opportunity to consider." Ellis v. Swensen, 
2000 UT 101, P30. 
In this case, Big Sky has not argued plain error, nor has it made any attempt to 
demonstrate that "exceptional circumstances" caused its failure to oppose Fireman's 
Fund's Motion. Instead, Big Sky attempts to justify its failure to oppose Fireman's 
Fund's Motion by arguing that the trial court had "already made its position clear" when 
it ruled on Lawyer's Title's Motion for Summary Judgment. (Appellant's Memorandum 
in Opposition to Fireman's Fund's Motion for Summary Disposition, p. 14.) In fact, Big 
Sky goes so far as to argue that, based on the trial court's decision on Lawyer's Title's 
Motion for Summary Judgment, it chose not to oppose Fireman's Fund's Motion for 
reasons of "judicial economy." (SeeicL, atp. 13.) As demonstrated below, Big Sky's 
12 
justification for failing to oppose Fireman's Fund's Motion is both illogical and 
disingenuous. 
First, Fireman's Fund and Lawyer's Title are two separate entities whose 
rights to summary judgment were determined separately and independently from one 
another. Fireman's Fund and Lawyer's Title moved for summary judgment at different 
times and in different motions. While the issues raised in Lawyer's Title's and Fireman's 
Fund's motions involved similar issues, the trial court found that Fireman's Fund was 
entitled to summary judgment in its own right. Moreover, the facts underlying Fireman's 
Fund's Motion, particularly those concerning the disclosure of the Fireman's Fund policy, 
are entirely distinct from the facts underlying Lawyer's Title's Motion. Simply put, 
Fireman's Fund's Motion for Summary Judgment was a separate motion which Big Sky 
had a duty to oppose. When Big Sky chose to do nothing, the trial court considered the 
motion uncontested and, after finding it to be meritorious, granted the same. 
Second, Big Sky's attempt to bootstrap arguments raised in opposing Lawyer's 
Title's Motion in an effort to demonstrate that it preserved issues on appeal reveals 
profound inconsistencies. On the one hand, Big Sky suggests that it did not respond to 
Fireman's Fund's Motion for Summary Judgment "because the trial court had already 
made its position clear" when it granted Lawyer's Title's Motion for Summary Judgment 
and denied Big Sky's Motion for Leave to Amend. (Appellant's Memorandum in 
Opposition to Fireman's Fund's Motion for Summary Disposition, p. 14.) However, at 
the same time, Big Sky challenges the applicability of the trial court's decision to deny 
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Big Sky's Motion to Amend with respect to Fireman's Fund, arguing that the trial court 
did not make "specific factual findings of untimeliness, unjustifiable delay, or prejudice 
as to Fireman's Fund." (Appellant's Brief, p. 26.) Big Sky cannot have it both ways. 
If Big Sky truly believed that the trial court's decision denying Big Sky's 
Motion to Amend was improper or inapplicable as to Fireman's Fund, Big Sky had an 
obligation to raise these arguments in response to Fireman's Fund's Motion for Summary 
Judgment. Big Sky however chose to forego presenting these arguments to the trial court, 
and instead presents these arguments for the first time on appeal. 
Third, the trial court made it clear at the hearing on Lawyer's Title's Motion 
that its ruling did not dispose of Big Sky's claims against Fireman's Fund. After ruling 
on Lawyer's Title's Motion, the trial court took the opportunity to say a few words 
regarding Fireman's Fund. The trial court stated: 
THE COURT: All right. Now, I just wanna address Fireman's 
Fund. Yes, you were bandied around in the pleadings from both 
sides, but you're not before me on anything, Mr. Belnap, so you'll 
have to wait until the dust sorts and see what - - how this impacts 
your client's position. But you and Mr. Durbano get to live to 
fight another day. Okay? 
(R. 720, p. 25-26.) (Emphasis added.) The above-excerpt from the hearing on Lawyer's 
Title's Motion for Summary Judgment shows that, despite Big Sky's insinuation to the 
contrary, the trial court in no way disposed of Big Sky's claims against Fireman's Fund 
when it ruled on Lawyer's Title's Motion. Rather, it shows that, with respect to 
Fireman's Fund, there were still issues left open and to be determined. Fireman's Fund's 
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filed its Motion for Summary Judgment so that those issues could be determined. Big 
Sky had an opportunity and duty to respond and oppose Fireman's Fund's Motion, but 
decided instead to do nothing. 
Fourth, Big Sky's justification for failing to oppose Fireman's Fund's Motion 
for Summary Judgment, if accepted, would create poor judicial precedent. In an effort to 
rationalize its failure to respond to Fireman's Fund's Motion, Big Sky argues: 
any response . . . would have been like the remaining Sioux Indians 
at Wounded Knee mounting another excuse for additional slaughter 
a few days after the first massacre. The relevant arguments had 
already been briefed and decided previously, and Fireman's Fund's 
Motion for Summary Judgment was merely a formality leading to 
the inevitable dismissal. . . . After the trial court's decision with 
respect to Lawyers Title, any response to Fireman's Fund would 
have been futile. 
(Memorandum in Opposition to Fireman's Fund's Motion for Summary Disposition, p. 
14.) 
As set forth above, the trial court expressly advised the parties that Fireman's 
Fund and Big Sky would have the issues between them heard on the merits at a later date. 
(R. 720, p. 25-26.) That date arrived when Fireman's Fund filed its Motion for Summary 
Judgment. Big Sky had an opportunity to oppose Fireman's Fund's Motion, but failed to 
do so. This decision by Big Sky was shortsighted, as Big Sky was required to oppose 
Fireman's Fund's Motion in order to preserve any issues for appeal. In Busch Corp. v. 
State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 743 P.2d 1217, 1219 (Utah 1987), the Utah Supreme 
Court stated: 
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For a question to be considered on appeal, the record must clearly 
show that it was timely presented to the trial court in a manner 
sufficient to obtain a ruling thereon; we cannot merely assume that 
it was properly raised. The burden is on the parties to make certain 
that the record they compile will adequately preserve their 
arguments for review in the event of an appeal. 
Here, Big Sky did not preserve any issues for appeal with respect to Fireman's 
Fund. The record is devoid of any pleading or argument made by Big Sky to the trial 
court in opposing Fireman's Fund's Motion for Summary Judgment. Nevertheless, Big 
Sky would ask this Court to find that its failure to oppose Fireman's Fund's Motion be of 
no consequence, and that the Court rely on inferences and assumptions in finding that it 
preserved issues for appeal against Fireman's Fund. As demonstrated above, Utah law 
does not share Big Sky's relaxed view of a party's duty to preserve issues for appeal. 
Big Sky has the burden of showing that the issues raised on appeal were timely 
presented to the trial court. Big Sky's decision not to oppose Fireman's Fund's Motion 
for Summary Judgment and preserve issues for appeal was not, as Big Sky suggests, a 
"mere technicality." (Memorandum in Opposition to Fireman's Fund's Motion for 
Summary Disposition, p. 15.) Rather, it was a substantial miscalculation that precludes 
Big Sky from pursuing this appeal against Fireman's Fund.2 
2
 Big Sky's suggestion that it did not oppose Fireman's Fund's Motion due to 
concerns for "judicial economy" is nothing more than a post hoc rationalization that in no 
way excuses its failure to preserve issues for appeal. (Appellant's Memorandum in 
Opposition to Fireman's Fund's Motion for Summary Disposition, p. 13.) 
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IL THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED 
THAT BIG SKY'S AMENDED COMPLAINT ASSERTED A 
SINGLE CLAIM FOR FRAUDULENT NONDISCLOSURE 
AGAINST FIREMAN'S FUND. 
Big Sky argues on appeal that the trial court erred in determining that its 
Amended Complaint alleged only a single claim for fraudulent nondisclosure against 
Fireman's Fund. Again, this issue was not raised by Big Sky when Fireman's Fund 
moved for summary judgment. Nonetheless, Big Sky argues that the trial court erred 
when, in determining Lawyer's Title's Motion for Summary Judgment, it gave no regard 
to other language or "reasonable inferences therefrom," which Big Sky claims sufficiently 
sets forth additional causes of action. (Appellant's Brief, p. 33.) 
Out of the seven (7) separately identified causes of action set forth in its 
Amended Complaint, Big Sky's Sixth Cause of Action is the only cause of action directed 
at Fireman's Fund. (R. 174-82.) Big Sky's Sixth Cause of Action alleges the following: 
44. Defendant Lawyers Title and Fireman's Fund knew that 
Defendant Fireman's Fund's agent, Defendant TitlePac, had 
issued a professional liability insurance policy to Defendant Avis 
and Archibald that was in force at the time of Plaintiff s claim. 
45. Defendants Lawyers Title, Fireman's Fund, and TitlePac have 
fraudulently attempted to conceal from Plaintiff that a professional 
liability insurance policy exists for Defendant Avis and Archibald 
to cover Plaintiffs claim, which fraud has damaged Plaintiff in an 
amount to be established upon proof at the time of trial. 
46. Plaintiff is a third party beneficiary under any and all policies 
of insurance issued by Lawyers Title, Fireman's Fund and 
TitlePac, and that these parties are contractually liable for their 
insurance liabilities. 
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(R. 180-81.)3 The trial court determined that Big Sky's Sixth Cause of Action against 
Fireman's Fund was one for fraudulent nondisclosure. On appeal, however, Big Sky 
argues that in addition to fraudulent nondisclosure, its Amended Complaint can be read to 
include other "[p]ossible causes of action," including "vicarious liability for inter alia, 
Avis and Archibald's negligence, including common law and statutory causes of action." 
(Appellant's Brief, p. 33.) 
Rule 8 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that "[a] pleading which 
sets forth a claim for relief,. . . shall contain (1) a short and plain statement of the claim 
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. . . ." Utah R. Civ. P. 8(a). Importantly, Rule 
8 also provides that "[e]ach averment of a pleading shall be simple, concise, and direct." 
UtahR. Civ. P. 8(e)(1). 
In this case, Big Sky's argument that the trial court erred by not inferring 
numerous additional causes of action into its singular, "Sixth Cause of Action," is clearly 
without merit. While Rule 8 requires that a party be "simple" and "concise," it also 
requires that a party be "direct" in its pleadings. See Utah R. Civ. P. 8(e)(1). Nothing in 
Big Sky's Amended Complaint is "direct" in alleging any cause of action other than 
3
 Big Sky also argues that additional causes of action can be inferred from its 
prayer for relief, which states: "Fireman's . . . is liable for damages incurred by their 
insured and that they committed fraud upon Plaintiff in relation to the denial of Plaintiff s 
claim for damages in relation to the escrowed funds and the unwillingness to produce a 
policy or policy number for such insurance." (Appellant's Brief, p. 33) (citing R. 174-
84.) 
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fraudulent nondisclosure. Simply put, Big Sky's Amended Complaint cannot be fairly 
read to allege any cause of action other than fraudulent nondisclosure. 
In its brief, Big Sky quotes from Blackham v. Snelgrove, 280 P.2d 453 (Utah 
1955), stating that "a complaint is required only to ' * * * give the opposing party fair 
notice of the nature and basis or grounds of the claim and a general indication of the type 
of litigation involved.'" (Appellant's Brief, p. 32.) While Fireman's Fund does not 
disagree that this is a correct statement of the law, Fireman's Fund does not agree that Big 
Sky's Amended Complaint satisfies this most basic requirement. To read Big Sky's 
Amended Complaint as alleging anything other than a claim for fraudulent nondisclosure 
would require not only a healthy imagination, but also a fair amount of creativity. 
Clearly, the trial court cannot be faulted for reading Big Sky's Amended Complaint in 
accordance with its plain language. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS 
DISCRETION IN DENYING BIG SKY'S MOTION FOR 
LEAVE TO AMEND. 
It is well understood that a trial court's ruling on a motion to amend a 
complaint will not be disturbed absent a clear abuse of discretion. See Neztsosie v. 
Meyer, 883 P.2d 920, 922 (Utah 1994) ("We will not disturb a trial court's ruling on a 
motion to amend a complaint absent a clear abuse of discretion."); Stratford v. Morgan. 
689 P.2d 360, 365 (Utah 1984) (indicating that the decision to allow leave to amend is 
discretionary with the trial court.) Furthermore, the general rule concerning abuse of 
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discretion is that the reviewing court will presume that the discretion of the trial court was 
properly exercised unless the record clearly shows the contrary. See Goddard v. 
Hickman. 685 P.2d 530, 534-35 (Utah 1984). 
While not exhaustive, Utah courts have typically focused on the following 
three factors when deciding whether to grant a motion to amend: (1) the timeliness of the 
motion; (2) the justification given by the movant for the delay; and (3) the resulting 
prejudice to the responding party. See Regional Sales Agency, Inc. v. Reichert 784 P.2d 
1210, 1216 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), rev'd on other grounds by 830 P.2d 252 (Utah 1992). 
In this case, it was the trial court's consideration of these factors that caused it to deny 
Big Sky's Motion for Leave to Amend.4 
During the hearing on Big Sky's Motion for Leave to Amend, the trial court 
noted that nothing prevented Big Sky from asserting its claims "against the insurance 
companies from the get-go." (R. 720, p. 23.) The trial court further noted that it was only 
after Avis and Archibald went out of business that Big Sky turned its attention to the 
insurance companies. With respect to the passage of time and the statute of limitations, 
the trial court stated, "it would be prejudicial and unfair to the defendants to have to 
defend on a claim that could have come right out of the chute, and now they would be 
faced with something that would be time barred by the statute of limitations. That's about 
4
 Lawyer's Title filed a memorandum opposing Big Sky's Motion for Leave to 
Amend, and Fireman's Fund formally joined in the same. (R. 384; R. 411, respectively.) 
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as prejudicial as I think that you can get." (R. 720, p. 24.)5 
In its brief, Big Sky suggests that the trial court denied its Motion for Leave to 
Amend simply because it believed that such a motion was an inappropriate response to a 
motion for summary judgment. (See Appellant's Brief, p. 23.) This is not true. While 
the trial court did question the propriety of Big Sky responding to a motion for summary 
judgment by seeking leave to amend, the trial court nevertheless gave due consideration 
to Big Sky's Motion. The trial court considered Big Sky's Motion for Leave to Amend, 
but rightly decided, based on considerations of timeliness, justification and prejudice, to 
deny the Motion. 
The acts giving rise to this lawsuit occurred over eight years ago. Almost four 
years ago, the trial court granted Big Sky's first Motion for Leave to Amend so that it 
could assert claims against Lawyer's Title and Fireman's Fund. Almost a year later, and 
after Lawyer's Title had moved for summary judgment, Big Sky again sought leave to 
amend. Clearly, under the facts of this case, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by 
denying Big Sky's Motion. See Kleinert v. Kimball Elevator Company, 854 P.2d 1025 
(Utah Ct. App. 1993) (upholding the trial court's denial of plaintiff s motion to amend 
5
 In Kelly v. Hard Money Funding, Inc.. 2004 UT App 44, P38, this Court 
explained that another basis for a trial court to deny a motion to amend is "unreasonable 
neglect in terms of pleading preparation." While not stated in those exact words, this 
appears to have been part of the reason the trial court denied Big Sky's Motion to Amend. 
The trial court indicated that Big Sky could have asserted the claims it was seeking to add 
via its Second Amended Complaint from the beginning and that there was no reason 
justifying its failure to do so. (See R. 720, pp. 23-24.) 
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based on concerns that "this is a three year old case, it is an eight year old injury, and . . . 
if [res ipso loquitur] were to be pled [it] could well have been pled before in terms of 
amendment.") 
A. Utah law does not allow a party to amend 
a complaint to add a legally insufficient or 
futile claim. 
Big Sky goes to great lengths to argue that the trial court abused its discretion 
in denying its Motion for Leave to File Second Amended Complaint. While it is clear 
that the trial court's decision was correct and in no way constituted an abuse of discretion, 
there is yet another reason why the trial court's decision to deny Big Sky's Motion was 
correct - "[a] party may not amend a complaint to add a claim that is legally insufficient 
or futile." See Smith v. Grand Canyon Expedition Co.. 2003 UT 57, P33. 
In its (Proposed) Second Amended Complaint, Big Sky outlines its additional 
claim for "insurer liability," alleging that the insurance company defendants breached the 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing by not indemnifying it as a "third party 
beneficiary" to the insurance contract. Big Sky's (Proposed) Second Amended Complaint 
states: 
61. Plaintiff is a third party beneficiary to Defendants obligations 
to insure, protect, defend and indemnify Avis and Archibald, which 
third party benefits have not been received by Plaintiff. 
62. Defendants acts as alleged above and failure to insure, protect, 
defend and indemnify Plaintiff, as a third party beneficiary violate 
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealings [sic] requiring 
an award of punitive or exemplary damages. 
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(Underline original.) 
Under Utah law, the duty of good faith and fair dealing is limited to first 
parties to an insurance contract, and as such, only a first party can sue for breach of that 
duty. See Sperrv v. Sperrv. 990 P.2d 381. 383 (Utah 1999.) See also Ammerman v. 
Farmers Ins. Exch.. 430 P.2d 576, 577-78 (Utah 1967) (explaining that the duty of good 
faith is owed to first parties to an insurance contract, not third-party beneficiaries). This 
case does not involve a first-party relationship. Instead, this case involves a third-party 
relationship, to which Utah appellate courts have refused to extend the implied covenant 
of good faith and fair dealing. 
In Pixton v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.. 809 P.2d 746 (Utah Ct. App. 
1991), the plaintiff argued that an insurance company which insurers a tortfeasor under a 
liability policy has an obligation to deal fairly and in good faith with an injured third-party 
who has a claim against the insurance company's insured. IdL at 748. In rejecting this 
argument, the court found that there must be a relevant contractual relationship between 
the parties in order for the plaintiff to pursue such a claim. See icL at 749. The court 
explained: 
In sum, we are persuaded that there is no duty of good faith and fair 
dealing imposed upon an insurer running to a third-party claimant, 
such as [the plaintiff], seeking to recover against the company's 
insured. This conclusion is consistent with the commentators and 
the great majority of courts in other jurisdictions that have been 
confronted with the issue. As one well-known commentator on 
insurance law noted, cthe duty to exercise due care or good faith is 
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owed to the insured and not to a third party.5 14 G. Couch, Couch 
on Insurance § 51:136 (rev. 2d ed. 1982). 
The majority of courts faced with the potential existence of a duty 
of good faith and fair dealing running from an insurance company 
to a third-party claimant seeking to recover against the company's 
insured have rejected such a notion. 
Id. at 749-50. 
The court in Pixton concluded that the insurance company did not owe the 
plaintiff a duty to deal fairly and in good faith in her capacity as a third-party claimant. 
Accordingly, the court held that the trial court correctly dismissed the plaintiffs claim for 
breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing as a matter of law. 
A similar result was reached in Savage v. Educator's Ins. Co.. 908 P.2d 862 
(Utah 1995). In that case, the Supreme Court of Utah held that the plaintiff, a third-party 
claimant, could not bring a claim for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing 
because there was no privity of contract between the claimant and the insurer. The court 
stated, "[bjecause [the plaintiff] has no contractual relationship with [the insurer], she has 
no cause of action against it for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing." 
Id at 866. The court also noted that this conclusion was consistent with the great 
majority of courts in other jurisdictions that have confronted the issue. See id. 
Under Pixton and its progeny, it is well-settled that only a first party may sue 
for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. See Sperrv v. Sperrv. 990 P.2d 
at 383 (stating "Utah law clearly limits the duty of good faith to first parties to insurance 
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contracts"). 
In this case, Big Sky claims that it is a third-party beneficiary under the 
Fireman's Fund policy and that Fireman's Fund somehow breached the covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing by not settling its claim. (Appellant's Brief, p. 33.) Big Sky, 
however, is not an insured. Big Sky is simply a third-party claimant seeking to recover 
damages against one of Fireman's Fund's insureds. Under Utah law, Big Sky cannot 
maintain an action against Fireman's Fund for breach of the implied covenant. Because 
there is no relevant contractual relationship between Big Sky and Fireman's Fund, Big 
Sky cannot make a claim against Fireman's Fund for breach of the covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing. See Pixton, 809 P.2d at 749. 
Because Big Sky's "insurer liability" claim is not allowed as a matter of law, 
and because the other claims set forth in Big Sky's Second Amended Complaint are not 
directed at Fireman's Fund (i.e., "vicarious liability and statutory strict liability"), the 
issue of whether the trial court erred in denying Big Sky's Motion for Leave to Amend is 
entirely moot.6 Simply put, with respect to Fireman's Fund, the outcome of this case was 
not affected by the trial court's decision to deny Big Sky's Motion for Leave to Amend. 
6
 In its brief, Big Sky attempts to argue that its "insurer liability" claim 
encompasses more than just a claim for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing. Big Sky asserts that, while never pled against Fireman's Fund, it is entitled to 
relief under Utah statutory law, as well as common-law negligence. These claims have 
heretofore never been asserted against Fireman's Fund and, as discussed previously, were 
not raised by Big Sky as part of any opposition to Fireman's Fund's Motion for Summary 
Judgment. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Appellee Fireman's Fund Insurance Company 
respectfully requests that the Court affirm the judgment of the trial court, and award it the 
costs it has incurred in defending this appeal. 
DATED this c A ^ a v of December, 2005. 
STRON0 & HANNI 
Paul M. Belnap 
Andrew D. Wright 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Fireman's Fund Insurance Company 
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